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Key Supplier Involvement in IT-Enabled Operations: When Does It Lead to Improved
Performance?

Abstract
As firms continue to invest in IT resources and collaborate with key suppliers, many fail to
benefit from these activities. Drawing on resource orchestration theory and the relational view of
interfirm competitive advantage, we examine the contingent relationships among IT resources,
key supplier involvement, and the focal firm’s performance. Using a multi-informants dataset
from the manufacturing sector in China, we find that supplier involvement mediates the positive
effect of IT resources on the focal firm’s performance only when there is a high level of mutual
trust and when competitive intensity is low in the focal firm’s environment. In a highly
competitive environment, however, mutual trust dampens the positive effect of supplier
involvement on the focal firm’s performance, which reveals the “hidden costs” of interfirm trust.
In contrast, the direct positive effect of IT resources on the focal firm’s performance is amplified
by mutual trust when competitive intensity is high, suggesting that the focal firm will fare better
without supplier involvement under these conditions. Therefore, key supplier involvement in the
focal firm’s IT-enabled operations does not always lead to improved performance and its effect
on performance is contingent on relational and environmental variables.

Key words: IT resources; supplier involvement; firm performance; mutual trust; competitive
intensity
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Key Supplier Involvement in IT-Enabled Operations: When Does It Lead to Improved
Performance?

1. Introduction
As the business environment becomes more competitive, firms increasingly look to
external resources such as key suppliers to build and sustain their competitive advantage (Song
& Benedetto, 2008; Walter, 2003; Yeniyurt et al., 2014). Supplier involvement entails a close
collaborative relationship in which the supplier directly participates in the customer’s product
design and implementation processes such that the supplier’s expertise can be effectively
integrated (Fossas-Olalla et al., 2015; Yeniyurt et al., 2014). As Ireland et al. (2002) suggest,
this type of interfirm alliance is becoming the new paradigm of competition rather than the
stand-alone competition between individual firms. While supplier involvement can enhance the
focal firm’s competitive advantage by developing collective value-creating resources that the
focal firm cannot create independently (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002), some
researchers have cautioned against indiscriminant employment of supplier involvement as a
generic strategy in that many such collaborative efforts failed to deliver intended benefits (Smets
et al., 2013). In fact, sometimes supplier involvement can even dampen performance (Das et al.,
2006), which may be caused by hampered organizational learning or loss of objectivity
especially in strong supplier-customer relationships (Jean et al., 2014; Villena et al., 2011).
A related issue in buyer-seller relationships is the role of information technology (IT).
While the literature generally posits that employment of IT resources facilitates the development
of firm- level competitive advantage, research has failed to establish a direct, definitive link
between IT resources and firm performance (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1998; Lucas, 1999; Santhanam
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& Hartono, 2003), which suggests that the effects of IT resources on firm performance are more
likely indirect and context-specific. It has been suggested that the performance outcomes of IT
resources are a function of the combination of other resources that are complementary with the
focal resource (Chadwick et al., 2015). Although it is relatively easy to imitate or acquire similar
IT resources by competing firms, knowledge reconfiguration, creation, and application resulting
from key supplier involvement are much more socially complex, causally ambiguous, and tacit
in nature, which becomes very difficult for competitors to imitate (Wernerfelt, 1984). In other
words, IT resources can provide a platform that enables the focal firm to dynamically deploy and
reconfigure its resources by effectively learning and integrating the supplier’s knowledge and
expertise (Fawcett et al., 2011; Wu, Wu, & Si, 2016). From the perspective of resource
orchestration theory (Sirmon et al., 2011), IT resources provide an efficient means through
which the focal firm’s own knowledge and expertise can be augmented and combined with the
key supplier’s skills and technologies by the focal firm’s deliberate strategic choices (e.g.,
supplier involvement). Although scholars have highlighted the importance of interorganizational
deployment of IT resources (Ragatz et al., 1997; Saeed et al., 2011), it is surprising that very few
studies have explicitly considered the role of supplier involvement in the IT-enabled
environment, given the role of IT in connecting the buyer and supplier firms in decision-making
and operational processes. Therefore, the extent to which the focal firm’s IT resources can be an
effective tool in integrating the key supplier’s resources in the focal firm’s own operations,
thereby rendering the focal firm a competitive advantage, remains to be seen. It seems reasonable
that the power of interfirm resource orchestration can only be harnessed through wellcoordinated interfirm collaborations made efficient by IT technologies.
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The above review of the IT and supplier involvement literature gives rise to two
important research questions. First, because IT resources will more likely become a true source
of competitive advantage when they are used to acquire, accumulate, and bundle complementary
resources from an exchange partner via interfirm collaboration (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Hitt et al.,
2011; Ireland et al., 2002), a logical research question is: To what extent does supplier
involvement mediate the positive effect of IT resources on the focal firm’s performance? Second,
interfirm collaboration such as supplier involvement involves resource sharing, tacit knowledge
exchange, and interorganizational learning, all of which may expose both exchange partners to
risks such as partner opportunism and learning races resulting from divergent motivations and
goals (Ireland et al., 2002). Therefore, a critical boundary condition of the effective supplier
involvement is interfirm trust (i.e., mutual trust), which may be the most effective means of
safeguard against partner opportunism (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and can facilitate interfirm
cooperation (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). However, research has also uncovered negative, albeit
unexpected effects of mutual trust on interfirm collaboration where innovation or market
responsiveness may suffer (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Fang et al., 2008). That is, interfirm trust
may have its “hidden costs”, although conditions under which such dark side effects of mutual
trust may outweigh its benefits remain unclear. Because the contingencies of resource-related
strategic choices (e.g., supplier involvement) are “poorly understood and form a critical future
research agenda” (Sirmon and Hitt, 2009, p.1375), our second research question responds to this
call and askes: Under what conditions will supplier involvement lead to improved performance
of the focal firm’s IT-enabled operations?
Drawing on resource orchestration theory (Chadwick et al., 2015; Hitt et al., 2011;
Sirmon et al., 2011) and the relational view of interorganizational competitive advantage (Dyer
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and Singh, 1998), this study proposes a moderated mediation model of IT-enabled supplier
involvement (Figure 1). Empirical results using a multi- informants dataset collected from the
manufacturing sector in China provide compelling support for the research framework. In
particular, we find that supplier involvement partially mediates the positive effect of IT resources
on the focal firm’s performance, which highlights the value of supplier involvement in the ITenabled resource orchestration process. However, supplier involvement is not a “silver bullet” as
results indicate that mutual trust and competitive intensity in the focal firm’s environment are
critical boundary conditions. When competitive intensity is low, mutual trust amplifies the
positive mediation effect of supplier involvement; in contrast, when competitive intensity is high,
the “hidden costs” of mutual trust may outweigh its benefits, thereby significantly compromising
the value of supplier involvement. In fact, when both competitive intensity and mutual trust are
high, the focal firm will actually fare much better without supplier involvement, possibly
because the focal firm benefits from supplier cooperation while not falling victim to routine
rigidity and cognitive lock-in typically embedded in closely integrated interfirm operations (Fang
et al., 2008).
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. After a review of relevant literature,
we formulate research hypotheses grounded in resource orchestration theory and the relational
view of interorganizational competitive advantage. We then describe our research methods and
report empirical results. We conclude the paper with a discussion of implications to theory and
practice, limitations of the current study, and future research directions.
-- Figure 1 about here -2. Literature Review
2.1. Information technology (IT) resources
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Information technology (IT) is a critical organizational resource in cultivating
strategically important interfirm relationships (Lee & Scott, 2015). While there is no
unanimously agreed-upon definition, IT resources typically include two interrelated elements:
(1) IT infrastructure such as computer hardware, software, and communication systems and (2)
technical and managerial IT skills (Bharadwaj, 2000; Davis & Golicic, 2010; Ryssel et al.,
2004). That is, IT resources include both tangible (e.g., computer equipment) and intangible
(e.g., skills) dimensions in its operational definition.
Although it is commonly held that IT resources can improve firm performance, scholars
have struggled to establish conclusive evidence linking IT resources to superior financial
performance (Bharadwaj, 2000; Dong et al., 2009; Hitt & Brynjolfsson, 1996). For example,
while Bharadwaj (2000) reported that firms with high IT-enabled capabilities tend to have
significantly higher profit ratios, Hitt & Brynjolfsson (1996) discovered a negative relationship
between IT investment and profitability, yet Ryssel et al. (2004) found that IT deployment had
no significant effects on value creation in business relationships. Empirically, many firms have
made substantial investments in IT resources without deriving anticipated benefits (Bharadwaj,
2000; Vanpoucke et al., 2014). These inconsistent findings are unsettling as they directly
question the value of IT (Dong et al., 2009; Hitt & Brynjolfsson, 1996).
Because IT infrastructure can be acquired and duplicated fairly easily by competitors, IT
investments per se cannot become a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Bharadwaj,
2000; Davis & Golicic, 2010). According to the resource orchestration theory, the outcomes of a
resource deployment are determined by how the focal resource is effectively combined with
other relevant resources in its deployment (Chadwick et al., 2015; Sirmon et al., 2011). That is,
resources of a focal firm should be structured, bundled, and leveraged with complementary
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resources, which usually come from a collaborative partner, to maximize value creation and form
a competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Sirmon et al., 2011). IT-enabled integration
with a strategically important partner (e.g., key supplier) can turn their complementary
knowledge and skills into valuable, causally ambiguous, and hard-to-imitate interfirm resources
and routines. Consistent with this view, researchers have advocated investigating how IT
resources can be deployed to integrate with other resources in an interorganizational setting,
which ultimately affects firm performance (Jean et al., 2010; Lee & Scott, 2015; Ryssel et al.,
2004).
2.2. Supplier involvement
Firms are increasingly searching for external sources for innovation, value creation, and
competitive advantage (Walter, 2003; Yeniyurt et al., 2014). Among those external sources, key
suppliers are recognized as important partners for reducing new product development time,
improving product quality and service, obtaining access to new technologies and markets, and
lowering operations costs (Menguc et al., 2014; Yeniyurt et al., 2014).
Because companies must successfully integrate suppliers’ technologies and skills in order
to reconfigure their own resources to meet their strategic and operational needs, firms typically
involve their key suppliers in their product development and operations processes (Das et al.,
2006; Vanpoucke et al., 2014). Supplier involvement refers to the extent to which a supplier
directly participates in the focal firm’s new product development and operations processes (Jean
et al., 2014). While some research indicated that supplier involvement can enhance the focal
firm’s innovation, operational and financial performance (Afuah, 2000; Carr & Pearson, 2002;
Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001; Menguc et al., 2014), other studies either found no significant
effects or even reported negative influences of supplier involvement (Rodrigues et al., 2004;
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Swink et al., 2007; Vereecke & Muylle, 2006). As such, considerable ambiguity remains with
respect to the effect of supplier involvement on the focal firm’s performance outcomes (Das et
al., 2006; Primo & Amundson, 2002). Another outstanding issue regarding supplier involvement
as a resource-related strategic choice is whether supplier involvement is a universally viable
strategy or there are contingencies under which it may become ineffective and even
counterproductive (Sirmon and Hitt, 2009), especially when IT resources of the focal firm are
employed in integrating and routinizing the key supplier’s involvement in the operations process.
While some researchers have indicated the importance of IT in supplier integration practices
(Ragatz et al., 1997), few studies have explicitly linked IT resources to supplier involvement in
affecting firm performance.
2.3.Interfirm trust
According to the relational view of interorganizational competitive advantage (Dyer and
Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002), although interfirm linkages (e.g., IT-enabled supplier
involvement) may be a source of competitive advantage, a critical boundary condition for
effective collaborative outcomes is interfirm trust (i.e., mutual trust). When alliance partners
exchange, combine, invest in idiosyncratic assets, or share sensitive information, they may be
exposed to partner firm opportunism, thereby compromising effective cooperation between
partners due to perceived risks therein. In the scenario of suppler involvement, for example, the
supplier may be concerned about making idiosyncratic investments (e.g., dedicated machinery)
which can be used against it by the buying firm in future negotiations; similarly, the buying firm
may become vulnerable if the supplier passes the buying firm’s sensitive information (e.g., new
product technology) along to rival businesses.
In order to realize the competitive advantage of interfirm collaboration (e.g., supplier
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involvement), exchange partners must have effective governance mechanisms. Interfirm trust is
arguably the most effective and least costly means of governance that facilitates complex
interfirm exchange while minimizing concerns of partner opportunism (Dyer and Singh, 1998).
Defined as perceived credibility and benevolence of a target firm, trust has been extensively
studied in marketing and other disciplines. A large body of research establishes empirically the
various beneficial outcomes of trust. In an interfirm context, for example, trust was found to
enhance long-term orientation (Doney and Cannon, 1997), reduce perceived uncertainty and
facilitate cooperation (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). In a meta-analysis, Palmatier et al. (2006)
confirmed that trust is the single most effective predictor of interfirm cooperation. Mutual trust,
in particular, where both parties have a high perceived credibility and benevolence of their
counterpart, functions as an especially powerful safeguarding mechanism that promotes
information sharing and reduces collaborating firms’ tendency to engage in opportunistic
behaviors (Fang et al., 2008).
While the great majority of researchers have investigated the positive effects of trust,
some have reported negative, albeit counterintuitive effects of trust. For instance, Fang et al.
(2008) find that high levels of mutual trust may dampen the joint venture’s responsiveness to
external change. Selnes & Sallis (2003) report that interfirm trust may hamper the effect of
relational learning on focal firm performance. In a similar vein, Anderson and Jap (2005) suggest
that high levels of trust among a cohesive group of contractors led to the loss of innovation due
to the removal of external pressure. These findings suggest the “hidden costs” of high levels of
interfirm trust, which may be a function of interfirm routine rigidity, cognitive lock-in, and
complacency in the status quo. While the potential “dark side” of interfirm trust has been noted
in previous research, conditions under which such hidden costs of interfirm trust may outstrip its
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benefits remain largely evasive and unexplored. As McEvily et al. (2003, p. 100) insightfully
point out: “Indeed, little systematic research exists on the downside of trust”.
3. Theoretical foundation and hypotheses development
3.1. The role of supplier involvement in IT-enabled operations
According to resource orchestration theory (Chadwick et al., 2015; Hitt et al., 2011;
Sirmon et al., 2011), a limitation of resource-based view (RBV) is that the RBV (Barney, 1991)
focuses on static resources per se and fails to explicate how resources can be deployed
dynamically to produce sustainable competitive advantage. A central tenet of the resource
orchestration theory is that the effect of resource investment on firm performance is mediated by
managerial actions in selecting, combining, and leveraging compleme ntary resources, which
often entails gaining access to needed resources from partner firms to exploit opportunities (Hitt
et al., 2011; Sirmon et al., 2011). That is, “what a firm does with its resources is at least as
important as which resources it possesses” (Hansen et al., 2004, p. 1280). This is particularly
relevant in the IT-enabled supply chain context because IT infrastructure and investments can
easily be duplicated by competitors, which keep IT resources from meeting the RBV criteria of
being rare, valuable, non-substitutable, and hard-to-imitate firm-specific resources (Bharadwaj,
2000; Davis & Golicic, 2010). Noteworthy is that resources can extend beyond the focal firm’s
boundary, which can be integrated in interfirm routines and operations processes (Das et al.,
2006; Lee & Scott, 2015; Petersen et al., 2003). In particular, when IT infrastructure is used to
integrate the focal firm’s and its key supplier’s resources (e.g., skills and technologies), the
learning, bundling, and synchronizing process is socially complex, causally ambiguous, and
imperfectly understood by competitors (Bharadwaj, 2000; Das et al., 2006). Therefore, consistent
with resource orchestration theory, we argue that IT resources can render sustainable competitive
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advantage when deployed for integrating key suppliers into the focal firm’s own business
processes.
Supplier involvement entails frequent and timely communication between the focal firm
and the supplier (Perols et al., 2013). The focal firm’s IT resources can greatly improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of supplier involvement, which allows the focal firm to quickly
gather and interpret data, to routinize collaborative activities with the supplier, and to
continuously exchange time-critical information and learn from one another (Vanpoucke et al.,
2014). Supplier involvement can in turn improve idea generation and problem-solving
capabilities, resulting in more cost-efficient production and higher quality products during new
product design, testing, and commercialization stages (Petersen et al., 2003; Song and Benedetto,
2008), thereby leading to higher focal firm performance. Supplier involvement may also enhance
end-user satisfaction as it enables the focal firm to better respond to changing environment
(Vanpoucke et al., 2014). Therefore, the focal firm can use its IT resources to effectively bundle
and leverage the supplier’s expertise and resources to create a competitive advantage, which
subsequently leads to improved performance. We hypothesize:
H1: IT resources are positively related to supplier involvement.
H2: Supplier involvement is positively related to the focal firm’s performance.
IT resources include both physical infrastructure and human elements. Although IT
infrastructure per se is unlikely to prevent competitive duplications, the technical and managerial
skills needed to develop, implement, and maintain the IT-enabled organizational routines are
firm-specific and tacit in nature, are developed over time in a specific context, and are not easily
observable and replicable by competitors (Davis & Golicic, 2010). That is, the tacit knowledge
and skills required for running the IT resources can be indeed heterogeneous across competitors,
which involve significant experiential learning leading to more sustainable competitive
10
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advantage (Bharadwaj, 2000). As such, we also expect a direct positive effect of IT resources on
the focal firm’s performance, in addition to the indirect effect via supplier involvement.
H3: IT resources are positively related to the focal firm’s performance.
3.2. Relational moderator: mutual trust
Supplier involvement is inherently risky for both the focal firm and the supplier because
they must exchange sensitive information, which can make a firm vulnerable to its exchange
partner’s opportunism and exploitative behaviors (Jean et al., 2014; Narayanan et al., 2015). The
relational view of interfirm competitive advantage suggests that the nature of interfirm
relationships is not only economic but also socially embedded in buyer-seller interactions (Dyer
and Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002). Because interfirm exchange entails unspecified
obligations and reciprocity, trust–a form of relational governance–is essential for long-term
stable relationships in alleviating concerns of partner opportunism (Cavusgil et al., 2004). Trust
reflects a firm’s confidence in its exchange partner’s reliability and integrity (Morgan & Hunt,
1994). Importantly, trust must be mutual to be most effective, as unreciprocated trust will
quickly lead to instability or dissolution of the relationship (Smith and Barclay, 1999; Yeniyurt
et al., 2014). When mutual trust is high, perceived risk of partner opportunism is reduced as both
parties keep their counterpart’s best interest in mind and refrain from opportunism (Fang et al.,
2008; Yeniyurt et al., 2014), and firms will be more willing to share critical and sensitive
information with each other (Jap, 1999). Consequently, we expect a stronger positive association
of IT resources and supplier involvement when there is a high level of mutual trust between the
focal firm and its key supplier.
H4: The positive relationship between IT resources and supplier involvement is stronger
when mutual trust is high.
We also expect supplier involvement to have a stronger positive impact on the focal
11
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firm’s performance when mutual trust is high. Supplier involvement entails frequent and close
interactions between the focal firm’s and the supplier’s engineers (Perols et al., 2013), where
mutual trust is the “glue” that holds the collaborative relations together (Yeniyurt et al., 2014).
Although in general supplier involvement is expected to improve the focal firm’s performance,
this positive effect will be weaker if mutual trust is lacking, because representatives from one
company may not have full confidence in the counterpart’s employees’ competence and
integrity, thereby resisting to adapt their work patterns to accommodate those of their counterpart
(Fang et al., 2008). In contrast, high mutual trust lends confidence to the exchange partner’s
competence and reduces fear of exploitation. Consequently, mutual trust motivates cooperative
decision-making and a problem-solving orientation, which will lead to greater firm performance
(Fang et al., 2008; Jap, 1999; Yeniyurt et al., 2014).
H5: The positive relationship between supplier involvement and the focal firm’s
performance is stronger when mutual trust is high.

As stated earlier, IT resources are also expected to have a positive direct effect on the
focal firm’s performance because IT resources can enhance the focal firm’s market-oriented
competence (Davis & Golicic, 2010). In particular, IT resources enable the focal firm to collect
market information about end users, suppliers, and competitors (information generation), to
distribute relevant market information in a timely fashion to members of the organization who
may use it in decision-making (information dissemination), and to implement appropriate
strategies by adapting to the constantly changing environment (information use). In order to
transform this competence into competitive advantage, however, the focal firm needs its key
supplier’s full cooperation to accommodate the constantly changing downstream demands and
preferences (Wathne & Heide, 2004). That is, the focal firm cannot successfully tap the full
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potential of its IT resources without gaining adequate support of its key supplier. With high
mutual trust, the supplier is more likely to exchange market intelligence, share operations
information, and respond quickly to the focal firm’s requests, thereby enabling the focal firm to
improve its process flexibility, which leads to better market responsiveness and performance.
H6: The positive relationship between IT resources and the focal firm’s performance is
stronger when mutual trust is high.
3.3. Environmental moderator: competitive intensity
Competitive intensity refers to the degree of competition the focal firm faces in the
market (Jaworksi & Kohli, 1993). When competitive intensity is high, companies engage in
frequent competitive activities such as price reduction and promotional campaigns, thereby
creating market and demand uncertainty. The implication of high competitive intensity is twofolded. On the one hand, from the resource orchestration theory’s perspective, using IT
capabilities to integrate the key supplier’s competence in the focal firm’s operations process can
create interfirm-specific competitive advantage that wards off intense competitive threat (Hitt et
al., 2011; Sirmon et al., 2011), which should motivate IT-enabled supplier involvement. On the
other hand, however, when competitive intensity is high, supplier involvement in the focal firm’s
operations becomes riskier for both parties because partner opportunism will prove more
damaging as competitors can quickly erode market share and profits. Therefore, the relational
view of the interorganizational competitive advantage would suggest that mutual trust is a
critical governance mechanism that alleviates the concerns over partner opportunism (Dyer and
Singh, 1998). That is, high competitive intensity will only motive IT-enabled supplier
involvement when mutual trust is high because both firms need to have a high level of
confidence that their counterpart is willing and able to adapt to the competitive environment
while refraining from self-interest seeking behaviors at the expense of the exchange partner
13
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(Adjei et al., 2009). Therefore, when competitive intensity is high, mutual trust is more critical
for IT-enabled supplier involvement. In contrast, when competitive intensity is low, mutual trust
becomes less impactful as the perceived risk therein is lower. We expect the following effect:
H7: There is a three-way interactive effect of IT resources, mutual trust, and competitive
intensity on supplier involvement such that mutual trust strengthens the positive impact
of IT resources on supplier involvement more when competitive intensity is high than
when competitive intensity is low.
IT-enabled supplier involvement allows the focal firm to utilize and embed key supplier’s
resources in its own operations process, which can enhance interfirm relationship predictability
due to increased coordination and communications via IT resources (Lee et al. 2012). While
mutual trust may enhance interfirm coordination efficiency due to relational norms, mounting
evidence also suggests a dark side of trust that can lurk inside otherwise strong relationships
(Clercq et al., 2009; Fang et al., 2008; Langfred, 2004; Selnes & Sallis, 2003; Villena et al.,
2011). Specifically, a high level of mutual trust has a strong emotional element to it, which can
discourage exchange partners from having constructive debates and healthy task-related conflicts
for fear of hurting their counterpart’s feelings. Consequently, high mutual trust may hinder
interfirm learning due to the groupthink syndrome and the filtering of disparaging viewpoints
from outsiders (Selnes & Sallis, 2003). That is, mutual trust “prevents, rather than encourages,
the benefits of task-related disagreements in fostering innovation” (Clercq et al., 2009, p. 293).
As Villena et al. (2011) insightfully point out, high levels of trust can produce social liability by
reducing a firm’s flexibility in decision-making due to obligations and reciprocity with the key
supplier. We argue the extent to which the “bright side” or the “dark side” of high mutual trust
manifests in IT-enabled supplier involvement depends on competitive intensity.
IT-enabled interfirm integration enhances relationship stability, which is further
strengthened by routinized norms and behavioral patterns bred by high interfirm trust (Lee et al.
14
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2012). In an environment where competitive intensity is low, the benefits of high mutual trust
will likely dominate because there is little need to disrupt and revamp routines. However, when
competitive intensity is high, routine rigidity and cognitive lock-in bred by high mutual trust can
impede firm performance. Indeed, resource orchestration theory suggests that the value of stable
interfirm routines and capabilities quickly diminishes as competitive rivalry intensifies (Sirmon
et al., 2011). The tendency for mutual trust to create routine rigidity is particularly high in
interfirm relationships where formal mechanisms and procedures are in place to facilitate partner
integration (Das et al., 2006; Fang et al., 2008). In supplier involvement, employees of the
customer and the supplier firms must collectively participate in the formal decision-making
process and frequently coordinate their activities, which will more likely give rise to routine
rigidity and relational inertia especially when mutual trust is high (Fang et al., 2008).
Moreover, high mutual trust may create a cognitive lock-in that isolates bonded parties
from the outside world because both parties think it unnecessary to adjust established routines
and procedures, causing poor responsiveness to environmental changes (Anderson & Jap, 2005;
Fang et al., 2008). The dark side of mutual trust may become more manifest and disruptive in a
highly competitive market, where mutual trust can significantly reduce the focal firm’s ability
and speed to adapt to the fast-changing competitive environment. In comparison, a low level of
competitive intensity is likely to mask the dark side of mutual trust due to little need for swift
adaptations to counter the competitive moves (Sirmon et al., 2011).
H8: There is a three-way interactive effect of supplier involvement, mutual trust, and
competitive intensity on the focal firm’s performance such that mutual trust significantly
strengthens the positive impact of supplier involvement on the focal firm’s performance
only when competitive intensity is low.

Although high mutual trust may negatively affect the effect of supplier involvement in a
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highly competitive environment, mutual trust can actually enhance the direct positive effect of IT
resources on the focal firm’s performance when competitive intensity is high. When the focal
firm employs its IT resources to facilitate the decision- making and implementation processes
independent of its key supplier, the supplier is more distal from the focal firm, which
significantly simplifies the coordination process and thwarts the development of detrimental
cognitive lock-in and routine rigidity typically found in integrated interfirm relationships (Fang
et al., 2008). As the environment becomes more competitive, IT resources enable the focal firm
to effectively generate, disseminate, and analyze market-oriented intelligence (Davis & Golicic,
2010).
Still, to act on the IT-enabled market intelligence with high efficiency, the focal firm
needs the supplier’s full cooperation to implement appropriate product and marketing strategies
in a timely fashion (Wathne & Heide, 2004). A lack of mutual trust can substantially
compromise the efficacy of the focal firm’s IT resources in adapting to a highly competitive
market (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Moreover, suppliers can serve as a source for competitive
intelligence, a critical resource that can be accessed and utilized by the focal firm to significantly
improve the focal firm’s market responsiveness (Adjei et al., 2009). However, the focal firm can
only turn its IT resources into a powerful tool in collecting, disseminating, analyzing, and
responding to market intelligence when there is a high level of mutual trust between both parties,
as the supplier is more willing to put its own resources to support the focal firm’s initiative.
When competitive intensity is low, mutual trust becomes less impactful as the need to collect and
respond to fast-changing market intelligence is much lower. Therefore, we argue that the benefits
of mutual trust will likely outweigh its “hidden costs” in a competitive market when IT resources
are employed without the direct participation of the key supplier in the focal firm’s business
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processes.
H9: There is a three-way interactive effect of IT resources, mutual trust, and competitive
intensity on the focal firm’s performance such that mutual trust significantly strengthens
the positive impact of IT resources on the focal firm’s performance only when
competitive intensity is high.

4. Methods
4.1. Sample and data collection
To test our model, we collected data from the manufacturing sector in China. China is an
appropriate empirical setting since its large manufacturing base accounts for more than a quarter
of the world’s total manufacturing output and supplier involvement in downstream customers’
operations is commonplace (Euromonitor, 2012). The survey instrument was first drafted in
English and then translated into Chinese according to the established back-translation procedures
(Brislin, 1980). We conducted in-depth interviews with a small group of sales and procurement
executives to gain further understanding of the research context, based on which necessary
modifications to the surveys were made. We collected data from two different informants in each
firm in an effort to minimize common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012).
In each firm, one informant identified a key supplier based on the importance and volume of the
procurement and provided data on IT resources, mutual trust, and supplier involvement
accordingly, while the other informant reported on firm performance, competitive intensity, and
product complexity (a covariate that we incorporated in the empirical model).
We obtained a representative list of 3,000 manufacturing firms from a Chinese
professional research company, from which we randomly selected 500 firms and contacted the
top management for their participation; 235 firms agreed to respond and provided useful data via
face-to-face interviews, for a response rate of 47%. The informants were top-level executives
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with broad organizational responsibilities in marketing, procurement, operations, and supply
chain, who had access to firm-level information. These firms in the sample represented industries
including machinery and metal fabrication, computer and electronics, automobile and parts,
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, chemicals, among others. Annual firm sales in the past year
were between 10 million and 4.5 billion RMB yuan (US$1.5 million to 670 million), with a
median sales revenue of 200 million yuan (US$29 million). The number of employees ranged
from 30 to more than 100,000, with a median of 1,600. We compared firm sizes (logarithm of
sales revenues and number of employees) of the responding and non-responding firms via t-tests
and found no significant differences, suggesting non-response bias was not likely a problem.
4.2. Measures
We assessed IT resources with four items adapted from Davis & Golicic (2010).
Consistent with the definition of IT resources, these items assess the extent to which the focal
firm has made investments in IT infrastructure as well as competence of deploying IT resources
in its operations. Four items were adapted from Primo & Amundson (2002) for measuring
supplier involvement, which assess the degree to which the focal firm engages its key supplier in
its product development and operations processes. Mutual trust was measured with four items
adapted from Jap (1999) assessing the extent of mutual reliability and integrity perceived in the
relationship as a whole from the focal firm’s perspective. Due to budgetary and other challenges
in collecting dyadic data from both the manufacturing firms and their key suppliers, we could not
measure mutual trust by aggregating the scores of both exchange partners, which we
acknowledge as a caveat when interpreting our results and will discuss this issue again in the
limitation section. We note, however, if the manufacturing firms had any systematic tendencies
to inflate or deflate their perceived suppliers’ trust in them, the resultant lower variance in mutual
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trust would make it much more difficult for us to find significant two-way and three-way
interactions. The fact that we uncover these interactive effects somewhat alleviated this concern.
Moreover, this measurement approach appears to be consistent with marketing studies in similar
contexts (Fang et al., 2008; Jap, 1999), which essentially assessed the extent to which the focal
firm believes both parties trust each other.
Competitive intensity was measured with four items from Jaworski and Kohli (1993)
evaluating the number of competitors and degree of competitive activities in the focal firm’s
market. These constructs were measured on 7-point Likert scales (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 =
“strongly agree”).
We used relative measures of firm performance to overcome the difficulty of comparing
performances across industries and firms. In accordance with previous research (Slater & Narver
1994; Vorhies & Morgan, 2005), we assessed firm performance in terms of sales growth, profit
growth, profitability, and return on investment over the past 3 years. The anchors were 1 =
“much worse than major competitors” and 7 = “much better than major competitors.”
Finally, we incorporated two covariates1 when empirically testing the model, namely
product complexity and firm size, to control for the heterogeneity of firms across industries and
markets. Product complexity was measured with 2 items adapted from (Fang, 2008) to assess the
degree to which the product is technologically complex and sophisticated. We measured firm
size in terms of sales revenue in the previous year, and we took its natural logarithm to remedy

1

Per a reviewer’s request, we also included other covariates such as industry, firm age, and the firm’s ownership
structure (state owned, private owned, public traded, collective, foreign, or Sino-foreign joint-venture) in a
separate regression. The model results are essentially identical. Because there is no change for the statistical
significance of the parameter estimates, we only report results based on these two covariates to save space but
the aforementioned results of a separate regression model are available upon request.
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skewness in the data. All multi- item scales, along with their internal consistency estimates are
presented in Appendix A.
5. Results and discussion
5.1.Measurement model
We assessed the measurement model with a confirmatory factor analysis. The
measurement model with six latent constructs and 22 indicators exhibited acceptable fit: χ2 =
388.45 (df = 194), RMSEA = .065, NNFI = .95, and CFI = .96. Item loadings were all significant
and positive on their a priori constructs, and no significant cross-loadings were observed,
suggesting convergent validity and unidimensionality of the latent constructs (Anderson &
Gerbing, 1988). In addition, average variance extracted (AVEs) ranged from .57 to .73, and both
Cronbach’s alphas and composite reliability measures were above .80 for all constructs,
demonstrating internal reliability (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988).
For discriminant validity, we compared the squared correlations with the AVEs of all
pairs of latent constructs and found that no squared correlation exceeded the average AVE
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981). We also conducted a series of Chi-square tests, comparing an
unconstrained measurement model where the correlation between a pair of constructs was freely
estimated and a constrained model where the correlation was set to one, and the unconstrained
model always fit the data significantly better (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988).
Finally, because the data involving IT resources, mutual trust, and supplier involvement
came from one informant and the second informant reported on firm performance, competitive
intensity, and product complexity (i.e., single source), there may be a concern of common
method variance (CMV). We conducted a series of test to assess CMV. First, we used Harman’s
single factor test through an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) which included all 22 items of the
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six variables. A clear six-factor structure emerged, which explained 78.02% of the variance. The
first component explained only 31.17% of the total variance. Second, we compared in SEM the
hypothesized six factor-model with a one-factor model and a two-factor model (where each
factor has three variables and represents the corresponding informant who provided data on these
three variables). The results show that the six-factor model was a much better fit (χ2 = 388.45, df
= 194) than the single-factor model (χ2 = 2706.02, df = 209) and the two-factor model (χ2 =
2498.42, df = 208). Third, we followed Williams, Hartman, & Cavazotte (2010) to conduct a
series of SEM-based tests using a marker variable (i.e., CEO leadership style) approach. Again,
results indicate that interrelationships among latent variables were not affected by CMV. These
results, together with the fact that significant two-way and three-way interactions that we found
in the data cannot be artifacts of CMV (Siemsen et al., 2010), suggest that CMV is not likely an
issue in our study.
Therefore, acceptable psychometric properties for all latent constructs were established.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables in the model.
-- Table 1 about here -5.2.Hypothesis testing
Hypothesis testing was conducted with a series of hierarchical regression models for
supplier involvement and focal firm’s performance, respectively. In both cases, we entered the
two control variables first, followed by the main effect variables, and finally, the interaction
terms. All variables were mean-centered before the interaction terms were computed. Tables 2
and 3 present the unstandardized regression coefficients, their t-values, and the model R2
estimates.
-- Table 2 & 3 about here --
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Hypotheses 1-3 predict the indirect and direct effects of IT resources on focal firm’s
performance via supplier involvement. In particular, H1 proposes that IT resources are positively
related to supplier involvement. As the Model 3 column of Table 2 shows, the relationship is
found to be positive and significant (b = .101, p < .05), in support of H1. H2 predicts that
supplier involvement is positively related to the focal firm’s performance. As the Model 3
column of Table 3 shows, this hypothesis is supported (b = .330, t = 4.384, p < .01). H3, which
proposes a positive relationship between IT resources and the focal firm’s performance, is also
supported (Table 3: b = 1.28, t = 2.146, p < .05). Thus, H1-3 are fully supported, which illustrate
the partial mediation role of supplier involvement in the focal firm’s IT-enabled operations.
Hypotheses 4-6 are concerned with two-way interactions involving mutual trust. In
particular, H4 suggests that the positive relationship between IT resources and supplier
involvement is stronger when mutual trust is high. This hypothesis is supported as the
coefficient (see Table 2) for the IT-trust interaction on supplier involvement is positive and
significant (b = .118, p < .05). H5, which posits that the positive relationship between supplier
involvement and focal firm’s performance is stronger when mutual trust is high, is also
supported given the positive and significant involvement-trust interaction on performance (Table
3: b = .104, p < .05). Lastly, the positive relationship between IT resources and focal firm’s
performance is evidently stronger when mutual trust is high (b = .223, p < .01), in support of H6.
As such, H4-6 are fully supported.
Hypotheses 7-9 suggest more complex three-way interactive effects. More specifically,
H7 proposes that mutual trust strengthens the positive impact of IT resources on supplier
involvement more when competitive intensity is high than when it is low. However, as presented
in Table 2, the coefficient estimate for the 3-way interaction term is not statistically significant (b
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= -.015, ns), and therefore this hypothesis is not supported. H8 posits that mutual trust
significantly strengthens the positive impact of supplier involvement on performance only when
competitive intensity is low. Table 3 shows a statistically significant coefficient estimate for the
three-way interaction (b = -.132, p < .01). To help interpret this finding, we plot the simple slope
graphs in Figure 2 using the unstandardized regression coefficients with one standard deviation
above and below the mean values of the moderators. The figure shows that when competitive
intensity is low, the positive supplier involvement-performance relationship is the strongest at
high level of trust, whereas when competitive intensity is high, the strength of the supplier
involvement-performance relationship is virtually the same regardless of the level of mutual
trust. This finding is in complete agreement with the prediction of H8.
-- Figure 2 about here -Finally, H9 proposes a three-way interactive effect of IT resources, mutual trust, and
competitive intensity on the focal firm’s performance such that mutual trust significantly
strengthens the positive impact of IT resources only when competitive intensity is high.
Consistent with H9, the coefficient estimate for the three-way interaction is positive and
significant (b = .137, p < .01). The simple slope plots in Figure 3 show that when competitive
intensity is high, IT resources have a dramatically different relationship with the focal firm’s
performance across different levels of mutual trust. Specifically, when competitive intensity is
high, IT resources have the strongest positive effect on the focal firm’s performance when
mutual trust is high. When mutual trust is low, however, IT resources actually have a negative
effect on the focal firm’s performance. In contrast, the moderating effects of mutual trust are not
nearly as pronounced when competitive intensity is low (see Figure 3). Therefore, H9 is fully
supported.
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-- Figure 3 about here –
5.3. Research implications
While it is a widely held belief that both IT resources and supplier involvement can build
competitive advantage for the focal firm, empirical results have been inconclusive. Some
researchers have suggested that IT resources can only provide limited competitive advantage
because competitors can easily duplicate tangible IT infrastructure (Bharadwaj, 2000; Davis &
Golicic, 2010). Moreover, few studies have explicitly investigated the role of supplier
involvement in the IT-enabled operations, although suppliers are being increasingly integrated in
the buying firms’ operations (Menguc et al., 2014; Yeniyurt et al., 2014). By investigating the
moderated mediation role of supplier involvement, our study sheds light on two important
research questions identified in the introduction section: (1) To what extent do IT resources
create value by integrating the key supplier in the focal firm’s operational processes? (2) Under
what conditions will supplier involvement lead to improved performance?
According to resource orchestration theory, firms can build competitive advantage by
deploying their own resources in combination with other complementary resources that
maximize the value-creation potential of the focal firm’s resources (Chadwick et al., 2015; Hitt
et al., 2011; Sirmon and Hitt, 2009). This resource synchronization process requires efficient
information exchange and utilization that provides a rich interfirm learning context, which
facilitates the bundling and configuration of complementary resources and skills (Hitt et al.,
2011). Consistent with the resource orchestration theory, our results indicate that the effect of IT
resources on the focal firm’s performance is not entirely direct but is also indirect via supplier
involvement. Supplier involvement provides insight, knowledge, skills, and experience the focal
firm needs in order to improve market performance (Menguc et al., 2014). As engineers from
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both the focal firm and the key supplier collaborate closely, they engage in a learning process
that requires immediate and frequent communication for effective resource combination and
reconfiguration (Perols et al., 2013; Vanpoucke et al., 2014). It is in this context that the focal
firm’s IT resources can play a critical role in integrating the supplier’s resources by facilitating
information exchange, analysis, and learning. Moreover, IT resources can enable the
development of interfirm organizational routines that are context specific, valuable to both firms,
socially complex, and imperfectly understood by competitors (Chadwick et al., 2015). Therefore,
the focal firm’s IT resources become more valuable when integrated with the supplier’s
resources during supplier involvement, which create non-substitutable interfirm synergies that
lead to superior firm performance (Das et al., 2006).
Although supplier involvement partially mediates the positive effect of IT resources on
focal firm’s performance, there are conditions under which the effect of supplier involvement
may be amplified or mitigated in the IT-enabled environment. According to the relational view
of interfirm competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998), supplier involvement is an interfirm
behavior that is not only economic but also is socially embedded and relational in nature. The
relational view of interfirm exchange considers interfirm relationship as a dynamic process in
which both parties are expected to carry out reciprocal activities directed toward one another
(e.g., mutual adaptation) in exchanging valuable resources (Hallen et al., 1991). To the extent
that IT-enabled supplier involvement entails the sharing of sensitive information, both the focal
firm and the key supplier may have concerns over potential partner opportunism and exploitative
behavior, thereby refraining from using IT resources for interfirm communication and resource
exchange (Das et al., 2006).
As such, to tap the full potential of IT resources, the focal firm must develop a highly
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collaborative relationship with the supplier characterized by high mutual trust, which is the
“glue” that holds collaborative relations together (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002;
Yeniyurt et al., 2014). As a potent relational governance against opportunism, mutual trust
enhances both parties’ confidence that their partner is credible and benevolent and will not abuse
sensitive information exchanged (Cavusgil et al., 2004). Indeed, our results illustrate that the
positive effect of IT resources on supplier involvement is strengthened when there is a high level
of mutual trust. Moreover, we find that supplier involvement has a much stronger positive effect
on focal firm’s performance when both parties trust each other, because mutual trust effectively
enhances both parties’ willingness to cooperate (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Palmatier et al., 2006).
Mutual trust is also found to amplify the direct effect of IT resources on focal firm’s
performance when the key supplier is not directly involved in the focal firm’s product design and
operations process. IT resources enable the focal firm to effectively collect, analyze, and
disseminate market information (Davis & Golicic, 2010). However, to effectively implement
competitive strategies based on market-based information, the focal firm must have the
supplier’s full support (Wathne & Heide, 2004). Toward that end, a high level of mutual trust
can not only motivate the supplier to share competitive information but also effective ly
coordinate with the focal firm to offer products and services that meet customers’ needs and
preferences (Adjei et al., 2009).
Despite the overwhelmingly positive moderation effects of mutual trust in all two-way
interactions, we find that the “hidden costs” of mutual trust will likely become manifest in
supplier involvement under high competitive intensity. Conversely, mutual trust amplifies the
positive direct effect of IT resources on the focal firm’s performance when the supplier is not
directly involved in the focal firm’s decision-making and operations processes. These opposite
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findings suggest that supplier involvement will not pay off across all situations and that mutual
trust is likely a double-edged sword in affecting the relative effects of IT resources vis-à-vis
supplier involvement on the focal firm’s performance.
Although the relational view of interfirm competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998)
suggests that mutual trust is a precondition for cooperative activity, the focus on the positive side
of mutual trust in interfirm relationships tends to “blind us to the considerable downside of trust”
(McEvily et al., 2003, p. 99). In a similar vein, Villena et al. (2011) warn that trust may at times
produce social liability because the focal firm may lose flexibility and independence in its
decision-making. When the focal firm and its supplier work together like a co-entity, high mutual
trust between them tends to build self-reinforcing routine rigidity, keep both parties from
exchanging negative information and searching for external information, and create cognitive
lock-in, all of which may hamper innovation and responsiveness (Clercq et al., 2009; Fang et al.,
2008; Selnes & Sallis, 2003). These “hidden costs” of high mutual trust become much more
pronounced when the focal firm’s market is highly competitive where competitors make frequent
changes in their product and/or marketing strategies, which would require interfirm collaboration
to modify or even abandon established routines (Sirmon et al., 2011). However, mutual trust
tends to breed routine rigidity and cognitive inertia (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Fang et al., 2008),
which makes it difficult for the trusting collaborating firms to quickly adapt to the changing
environment. To the extent that IT integration formalizes predictable interfirm behavioral
patterns (Lee et al. 2012), high mutual trust can solidify cognitive heuristics embedded in
supplier involvement leading to systematically biased judgements (McEvily et al., 2003).
Indeed, our results corroborate this argument by showing that mutual trust significantly weakens
the positive impact of supplier involvement on the focal firm’s performance when competitive
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intensity is high.
In contrast, keeping the supplier at a more distal position (i.e., without supplier
involvement) when the focal firm’s market is highly competitive proves to be beneficial,
especially when there is a high level of mutual trust. We argue that when the focal firm is able to
make independent product design and operational decisions, the bright side of trust is likely to
overshadow the dark side because interfirm routine rigidity and cognitive lock-in are less likely
to form; in the meantime, the supplier is responsive and supportive of the focal firm’s initiatives,
and is willing to make necessary adaptations to accommodate the focal firm’s strategies (Morgan
and Hunt, 1994). Therefore, IT resources will likely enable the focal firm to adapt more quickly
and effectively to the changing environment when both parties trust each other.
5.4.Limitations and future research directions
Like all other research, our study is subject to some limitations. First, although we
collected data for predictor and criterion variables from two different informants, they came from
the same company. A better approach may be to collect longitudinal objective performance data.
Second, our sample came from the manufacturing sector in China. The extent to which results
can be replicated in other contexts cannot be assumed without further empirical investigations.
Third, as we mentioned in the measurment section, the measure of mutual trust was not an
aggregate score of both the manufacturer’s trust in the supplier and the supplier’s trust in the
manufacturer. That is, results regarding the moderating role of mutual trust should be interpreted
with caution. What we essentially measured was the manufacturer’s perceived total dyadic trust
between itself and the supplier. Because the supplier’s trust was perceived by the manufacturer,
there could be some systematic upward or downward bias in the manufacturers’ reponses.
Although this measurement approach has been used by researchers in similar marketing studies
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(Fang et al. 2008; Jap 1999), future studies should collect dyadic data to allow for a more
rigorous test for mutual trust.
Our study also poitns out directions for future research. First, we find that the dark side of
mutual trust sets in for supplier involvement when competitive intensity is high. The literature
suggests that the “hidden costs” of trust are due to groupthink, filtering of external information,
cognitive lock-in, and routine rigidity (Fang et al., 2008; Selnes & Sallis, 2003). Future research
can explicitly examine these factors as well as potential countermeasures to mitigate their
negative influence on the efficacy of supplier involvement. Second, in contrast to its negative
moderation effect on the supplier involvement-performance association in competitive markets,
mutual trust has a positive moderation effect on the direct IT-performance link. As supplier
involvement only partially mediates the effect of IT resources on focal firm’s performance, an
exploration of the full underlying mechanisms would further our understanding of the effects of
IT resources.
Moreover, some researchers distinguish interfirm trust from interfirm reliance and
suggest that the latter may be more influential in deteriming interfirm performance outcomes
(Jiang et al., 2011)2 . Future studies can use reliance as a moderator in IT-enabled supplier
involvement and compare its effects with those of interfirm trust. Finally, we operationalized
supplier involvement as a global construt. However, researchers have suggested that the nature
or content of supplier involvement also matters. For example, supplier involvement can take the
form of process integration, product integration, or other types of intergation (Perols et al., 2013;
To, 2016). A supplier can serve mainly as a co-producer or as an information provider during the
new product design and development process (Fang, 2008). It has yet to be determined whether

2

We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
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the relationships in our model will vary when a more refined operationalization of supplier
involvement is employed. These intriguing questions can only be answered by future research.
6. Conclusion
This study makes important contributions to the literature by addressing two research
questions set forth in the beginning of the paper. First, consistent with the resource orchestration
theory and the relational view of interfirm competitive advantage, our study finds strong
evidence that IT resources can have a positive effect on the focal firm’s performance via the
partial mediation role of supplier involvement. Therefore, it appears that involving the key
supplier in the focal firm’s operations process using IT resources can create synergistic interfirm
competitive advantage leading to improved performance. Perhaps more importantly, our research
also identifies conditions under which the positive effect of supplier involvement may be
strengthened or compromised. While mutual trust can generally enhance the positive mediation
effect of supplier involvement when competitive intensity is low, mutual trust can actually render
supplier involvement an ineffective resource orchestration strategy due to the “hidden costs” of
mutual trust in highly competitive markets. In a highly competitive environment, the focal firm
can fare better without involving an otherwise trusting supplier in its operations process, which
helps dodge the “dark side” while benefiting from the “bright side” of high mutual trust. These
findings not only enhance our understanding of the contingent role of supplier involvement in
IT-enabled operations, but also enrich theory building by highlighting some of the contingencies
in the resource orchestration theory and the relational view of interfirm competitive advantage.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Std
Dev
1.08
.97
1.03
1.11
.95

IT resources
4.63
Mutual trust
4.95
Competitive intensity
4.62
Supplier involvement
4.88
Focal firm’s
5.09
performance
6. Log (annual sales)
12.13
2.03
7. Product complexity
4.45
1.47
*Correlations above .12 are significant at .05.

1

2

3

4

5

.27
.29
.32
.29

.27
.58
.25

.43
.09

.34

-

.13
-.05

.13
.09

.17
-.09

.01
-.10

.04
-.02

Table 2: Moderated effects on supplier involvement

Constant
Ln(annual sales)
Product complexity
IT resources
Mutual trust
Competitive intensity
(CI)
IT*Trust
IT*CI
Trust*CI
IT*CI*Trust
R2
Sig F Change

Model 1
(Control Only)
b
t-value
.000
.002
.017
.457
-.078 -1.539

.002
.307

Model 2
(Main Effect)
b
t-value
.000
-.001
-.052
-1.843
-.065
-1.671
.126
2.320
.556
9.211
.290
5.031

Model 3
(Interaction Effect)
b
t-value
.039
.718
-.038
-1.420
-.093
-2.512
.101 1.873
.532 9.127
.311 5.328

.442
.000

.118
.010
-.288
-.015
.518
.000

1.934
.199
-5.305
-.421
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6

.23

Table 3: Moderated effects on focal firm’s performance

Constant
Ln(annual sales)
Product complexity
IT resources
Mutual trust
Competitive intensity
(CI)
IT*Trust
IT*CI
Trust*CI
IT*CI*Trust
Involvement (INV)
INV*Trust
INV*CI
INV*CI*Trust
R2
Sig F Change

Model 1
(Control Only)
b
t-value
.000
.001
.020
.620
-.016
-.373

Model 2
(Main Effect)
b
t-value
.000
.000
.007
.227
.003
.076
.191
3.308
.057
.769
-.100 -1.571

.241

.002
.803

.164
.00

3.462

Model 3
(Interaction Effect)
b
t-value
-.116
-1.802
.006
.191
-.016
-.384
.128
2.146
.162
2.077
-.061
-.881
.223
-.130
.064
.137
.330
.104
-.061
-.132
.266
.00

3.330
-2.199
.889
2.473
4.384
1.794
-.838
-2.969
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Appendix A: Multi- item measurement scales
IT resources (α = .87; AVE = .63; ρc = .87)
1. Our company actively searches out and acquires state-of-the-art information technology.
2. Our company uses state-of-the-art information technology to communicate and share
information with the key supplier.
3. Our company has the knowledge and skills needed to maintain the best information
technology system.
4. Our company’s information system enables us to share business data for improving our
market knowledge across all business units.
Mutual trust (α = .91; AVE = .73; ρc = .91)
1.
2.
3.
4.

The
The
The
The

key supplier and our firm
promises the key supplier
key supplier and our firm
key supplier and our firm

consider each other's interests when problems arise.
and our firm make to each other are reliable.
are very honest in dealing with each other.
trust each other.

Competitive intensity (α = .82; AVE = .57; ρc = .84)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Competition in our industry is cutthroat
Price competition is a hallmark of our industry
One hears of a new competitive move almost every day.
There are many competitors in our target market.

Supplier involvement (α = .89; AVE = .68; ρc = .89)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Our company has involved the key supplier in our product development process.
The key supplier participates in our product development process.
Our company asks for the key supplier’s input for continuous improvement in our operations.
We work with the key supplier to improve our products and services.

Focal firm’s performance (Performance in the past three years) (α = .91; AVE = .71; ρc
= .91)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Sales growth
Profit growth
Profitability rate
Return of investment (ROI)

Product complexity (α = .91; AVE = .73; ρc = .84)
1. Our products are technically complicated.
2. Our products apply advanced/sophisticated technology.
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Figure 1: Conceptual model
Supplier
Invol vement

Foca l fi rm’s
performance

IT Res ources

Competitive
Intensity

Mutua l
Trus t

Figure 2: The moderation effects of mutual trust and competitive intensity on the relationship
between supplier involvement and focal firm’s performance
A. Low competitive intensity

B. High competitive intensity
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Figure 3: The moderation effects of mutual trust and competitive intensity on the relationship
between IT resources and focal firm’s performance
A. Low competitive intensity

B. High competitive intensity
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